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 1. Introduction 
Education policy of the two major political parties in England is currently predicated on assumption 
that giving schools greater autonomy from local authority control is a route to improving standards.  
This might be through more efficient decision-making and resource usage or because autonomy is a 
necessary precursor to market-like reforms whereby schools are somehow incentivised to compete 
for pupils.  Autonomy from local government has always been a feature of English schooling through 
the presence of state-funded church schools from the 19th century onwards, but the past two 
decades have seen a rapid growth in autonomy through the grant-maintained schools policy, City 
Technology Colleges, Academies and new regulation to make it easier for schools to acquire 
foundation status.  Today, 34 per cent of secondary school pupils are educated in an autonomous 
school. 
Tables of school performance in England are used as the empirical evidence that autonomous 
schools achieve superior performance in GCSE exams taken by 16 year-olds (e.g. DfES, 2007).  In 
these tables school performance is measured using contextual value-added (CVA) models where 
pupil achievement at GCSE is regressed on prior achievement and a set of pupil and school 
characteristics to control for context.  Any unexplained variation is attributed to school quality.  
However, although policy makers and journalists tend to draw causal inferences from these tables, 
the methods used will only yield unbiased estimates of the effectiveness of school types if 
unmeasured social characteristics of the pupil intake are uncorrelated with type of school attended.  
Furthermore, to infer causality between autonomous status and academic achievement there 
should be no unmeasured area characteristics that determine both the chances of a school 
becoming autonomous and a school’s ex-ante effectiveness. 
There are different types of autonomous schools in the English education system today and this 
article chooses to focus on foundation schools.  This large group of secondary schools is now long 
enough established to facilitate investigation of the long-run effects of school autonomy and it is 
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possible to do this without confounding other factors such as the religious ethos of the school.  By 
contrast the Academy programme, whilst currently at the forefront of the policy debate, is too 
recent to evaluate stable state impacts, and in any case there is no straightforward route to 
identifying a comparison group of non-Academies (see Machin and Wilson, 2008, for a short-run 
impact evaluation of Academies). 
There is no perfect approach to establishing causality where the assignment of autonomy to schools 
and the assignment of pupils to schools are both non-random.  In this article a combination of non-
experimental and quasi-experimental approaches are used to assess the extent to which sorting is 
confounding inference for the 2007 cohort of 16 year old school leavers in the National Pupil 
Database (NPD).  The presence of unmeasured pupil characteristics that might be correlated with 
school type is explored through the use of administrative data that extends beyond the standard 
NPD controls used in CVA calculations and also through the richness of the Longitudinal Survey of 
Young People in England.  The second section of analysis attempts to use natural variation in the 
assignment of school autonomy status to assess the effectiveness of (former grant-maintained) 
foundation schools by comparing the set of schools that just did, and just did not, win a vote of 
parents to become a grant-maintained schools in the mid-1990s, and thus are usually foundation 
schools today.  In other words, rather than compare progress of pupils at autonomous schools with 
those at all community schools, this technique evaluates policy by drawing on alternative 
counterfactual schools. 
2. The policy rationale for autonomy 
There have been consistent themes running through school autonomy legislation, including the 
grant-maintained schools policy, City Technology Colleges and the Academies programme.  The first 
claim is that autonomy puts in place both the incentives and the capabilities for substantial 
improvements in school efficiency.  This might be possible because autonomous schools are given 
control over financial, building and staffing decisions and this proximity of school senior 
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management teams and governors to the impact of decision-making might lead them to more 
efficient resource usage, for example in the timing and management of spending on technological 
projects.  Their ability to redeploy saved resources within their own school might incentivise them to 
use resources more efficiently than community schools.   
Secondly, politicians have argued that grant-maintained schools, City Technology Colleges and now 
Academies would increase parental choice through diversity of school provision and this would be a 
potential route to greater allocative efficiency in the sense that the schooling system would produce 
types of schooling that are most desired by parents.  However, it is largely agreed that regulations 
combined with restrictions imposed by the National Curriculum have prevented most autonomous 
schools from pursuing a particularly distinct curriculum or identity (e.g. Bush et al., 1993; Sherratt 
1994). 
Finally, it has been suggested that the policies of school autonomy are a catalyst for improvement in 
standards across the system as these schools provided a competitive threat to their neighbouring 
schools (or alternatively induced local authority officials to work harder to ensure other schools did 
not want to leave their control).  This direct competition effect, whereby increased competition for 
(certain) pupils induces neighbouring schools to increase effort directed at exams (thereby 
improving league table position and making the school more attractive to parents), has been 
extensively studied in English data with few finding substantive evidence for their impacts (e.g. Allen 
and Vignoles, 2009; Clark, 2009; Gibbons and Silva, 2008; Gibbons et al., 2008). 
Foundation schools 
Foundation status for schools arose from legislation in 1998 that brought to a close the grant-
maintained schools policy, a relatively radical experiment in school autonomy that gave one-in-six 
secondary schools independence from Local Education Authority (LEA) control between 1989 and 
1997.  Grant-maintained schools were owned and managed by their governing bodies, receiving 
funding directly from the Department for Education which in turn recouped the cost from the 
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former LEA’s revenue support grant. They were completely independent of the former LEA and 
accountable directly to the Department for Education. The grant-maintained school governing 
bodies dealt with all staff matters, including suspension and dismissal, though staff enjoyed the 
same pay and conditions as prior to the transfer of contracts.  Schools decided to pursue autonomy 
for a wide variety of reasons, including greater freedoms, higher levels of funding and avoiding LEA-
proposed closures or reorganisations (Bush et al. 1993). 
The 1998 legislation that created foundation status protected reduced rights to autonomy from local 
authority control for grant-maintained schools who retained the same control over operations and 
admissions as before, gradually lost their preferential financial treatment and were required to have 
some LEA-appointed governors (Anderson, 2000).  Most former grant-maintained schools chose to 
take foundation status (with some returning to Voluntary-Aided status and a few returning to local 
authority control).  This high degree of association between grant-maintained and foundation status 
is critical to the estimation strategy for dealing with non-random policy assignment in the second 
half of this paper. 
3. Estimation problem 
Studies of school effectiveness attempt to judge pupil outcomes, usually exam scores, holding 
constant fixed pupil and area characteristics that are outside the control of schools.  The measure is 
intended to represent the extent to which processes that take place in the schools such as behaviour 
policies, strength of governance and the organisation of teaching increase in pupil achievement.  
Figure 1 shows a conceptual education production function, whereby outside factors such as school 
context or pupil characteristics both indirectly and directly impact on the production of pupil 
achievement.  The suggestion is that school autonomy is capable of impacting on the nature of 
school processes that directly lead to greater pupil achievement. 
---------------- Figure 1 about here ----------------- 
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Contextual Value Added (CVA), the current approach used by government to judge school 
performance, extracts school residuals (or unexplained variation) from a multilevel regression model 
that includes basic measures of pupil prior attainment and background and school peer quality.  It is 
an attempt to produce a measure of school achievement that is uncorrelated with the background 
of the pupil intake so that all schools have an opportunity to be labelled as ‘effective’.  This is clearly 
a superior approach to judging effectiveness of schools than ‘raw’ league table position, but does 
not produce a direct measure of the strength of the school’s processes.  Where school processes 
cannot be explicitly measured, any variation in process that is correlated with contextual control 
variables will be removed from the estimation of ‘effectiveness’.  For example, if more affluent 
schools have systematically higher quality teaching, on average, due to access to a more favourable 
teacher labour market, calculating school performance conditioning on the context of the school will 
remove much of the variation in outcomes that was attributable to this higher quality teaching.  This 
does not entirely invalidate school effects that condition on contextual variables, but it does mean 
that they should only be interpreted as meaningful for comparisons between schools with the same 
context, rather than a valid method for comparing schools with very different social contexts. 
Recent British Government policy has been predicated on the idea that autonomy is causally related 
to pupil performance, yet it is possible that this inference is confounded by alternative explanations. 
First, that autonomous schools have pupils with unobserved family circumstances that allow them to 
make more progress in secondary school. Second, a reverse causation argument that effective 
schools chose at some point in the past to become autonomous schools and that these differences 
in effectiveness have simply persisted today.  
More formally, we believe there are a set of social characteristics of pupils and schools that affect (i) 
the chance that a school has become autonomous; (ii) the chance that a child attends an 
autonomous school; and (iii) pupil GCSE achievement at the school: 
P(school j is autonomous) = g(rj , vj) 
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P(child i attends an autonomous school) = h(xij , wij) 
gcseij = f(autonomousj , xij , wij , rj , vj) 
The set of observed pupil characteristics, xij, that might impact on school assignment and 
achievement include the child’s prior attainment, their ethnicity, sex, and so on.  The set of 
unobserved pupil characteristics, wij, could be the income, social, political or religious characteristics 
of the household, or more intangible characteristics such as the child’s motivation and capacity to 
learn.  The observed school characteristics, rj, that might impact on the designation of autonomous 
status and pupil achievement might include the current social composition of the area and the pupils 
in the school.  The unmeasured school characteristics, vj, could include the historical political control 
of the area, the characteristics of past headteachers, parent bodies or pupils, and so on. 
This article uses two approaches to demonstrate the extent to which these two non-random 
assignment mechanisms – the assignment of the policy to schools, and of pupils to schools – appear 
to confound inferences about the causal impact of autonomous status.  In the first approach, the 
number of unmeasured pupil characteristics are minimised as far as possible by supplementing the 
standard CVA approach to measuring secondary school effectiveness with new data.  These 
additional pupil variables come from two sources.  Administrative data from the National Pupil 
Database is stretched to its analytical limits by utilising early attainment data and small area 
statistics to act as proxies for unmeasured pupil characteristics.  The Longitudinal Survey of Young 
People in England, which provides rich information on the child’s home circumstances, supplements 
this data for a sub-sample of the population. 
The second approach deals with non-random assignment of autonomy status through the 
exploitation of randomness in the probability that a school became grant-maintained in the early 
1990s.  A school was only successful in gaining autonomous status of fifty per cent of parents agreed 
to the move in a ballot, so a regression discontinuity design is employed to compare schools that just 
did, and just did not, win the vote to become a grant-maintained (and therefore mostly now 
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foundation) school.  Neither of these two approaches deals with both assignment problems 
simultaneously because re-sorting of pupils has taken place in the 15 years since schools became 
grant-maintained.  That said, where school catchment neighbourhoods tend to have particular fixed 
characteristics that have persisted over the 15 years, the approach does not confound these area 
characteristics with effectiveness.  
4. Data 
Data for over a half a million school-leavers is drawn from the 2007 National Pupil Database (NPD). 
NPD is an administrative annual census of all pupils in state maintained schools with information on 
each pupil’s sex, age in months, free school meals eligibility (FSM), ethnicity (11 categories), special 
educational needs (SEN, 3 categories) and mother tongue recorded each year from 2002 onwards. 
This article uses pupils who are in year 11 (age 16) and are sitting GCSE examinations. These core 
NPD variables are linked to the child’s achievement in Key Stage 2 (KS2) tests in English (reading and 
writing), maths and science at the end of primary school as a measure of attainment prior to 
secondary school.  
The core NPD variables described above are extended for a subset of pupils who can be observed in 
all six years of school census data.  This allows the matching of multiple measures of pupil 
background variables that are time-variant, such as FSM and SEN.  Also, multiple indicators of the 
levels of deprivation (income deprivation affecting children index – IDACI) in the localised household 
area are matched via pupil postcodes. These deprivation indices are based on data from the 2001 
Census of Population and other administrative sources (ODPM, 2004) and are all imperfect 
indicators of the child’s social background to the extent that they measure average social 
characteristics of households in the lower super output area (containing an average of 17 pupils in 
the cohort).  Finally, the child’s achievement in a series of Key Stage 1 (KS1) tests is included. 
Where school peer group control variables are used in regressions to control for school context 
these are the percentage of pupils who are FSM eligible, the average KS2 score of the cohort and a 
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measure of the dispersion of the KS2 scores of the cohort.  Table 1 summarises the key variables. 
The main outcome variable used is total points achieved by pupils over their best 8 GCSE or 
equivalent examinations and is widely judged as a better discriminator of school performance than 
the alternative measure of 5+ A*-C grades. The GCSE exam is graded from A* (58 points) to G (16 
points), with 6 point increments between grades. The typical pupil achieves around 4 Cs and 4 Ds. 
---------------- Table 1 about here ----------------- 
The 2,963 schools in the dataset exclude grammar, private, special and other non-standard all-ability 
secondary schools.  Grammar schools are excluded because a very large majority of them became 
grant-maintained, with no clear counterfactual for the regression discontinuity design that follows.  
Thus, the entire analysis looks at the impact of autonomy on non-selective schools.  The school 
governance status of the secondary schools is categorised as foundation (non-grammar), voluntary-
aided (VA) (non-grammar), voluntary-controlled (VC) (non-grammar), Academy or City Technology 
College. The default school is a community (LEA controlled) comprehensive school, as shown in 
Table 2.  VA schools are long-standing autonomous schools that (almost all) have a religious 
foundation whereas VC schools are owned by a religious foundation but are local authority 
controlled.  Academies and City Technology Colleges are grouped together because both groups 
were small in 2007 (the distinction is becoming less important because many City Technology 
Colleges are now becoming Academies). 
---------------- Table 2 about here ----------------- 
The second source of data is the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England (LSYPE), which 
charts the progress of a cohort of about 15,000 young people who were initially contacted at age 
13/14 in 2004, and are being followed up every year into their mid-twenties.  Data analysed here are 
mostly drawn from the first wave of interviews of the young person and their main parent in 2004.  
It is supplemented by responses to questions by the young person in wave 3 at age 15/16 and by 
attainment data and detailed information on type of school attended from the NPD.  The timing of 
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the interviews is less than ideal for these research purposes because we would prefer measures of 
parental and pupil characteristics prior to secondary school where contamination by the treatment 
is impossible.  For this reason, care is taken to choose variables that reflect reasonably fixed 
characteristics of the household that are unlikely to be determined by the schooling system. 
The LSYPE dataset allows superior analysis of the impact of school type on pupil performance 
because it has good measures of the social background of families, including indicators of household 
income, parental education levels and occupational class (see Table 3).  It is a survey with moderate 
levels of non-response on certain variables such as those asked of a second parent.  Where non-
response is significant the variables are not used in this analysis, except for the household income 
variables on which a single imputation is performed. 
---------------- Table 3 about here ----------------- 
The final source of data used in this article is the grant-maintained schools database, which is used 
to extract voting data from the 1990s for all schools who held a parental ballot to opt-out of local 
authority control. The database was compiled by the Department for Education in the 1990s and is 
now archived in the National Digital Archive of Datasets. It provides details of all grant-maintained 
status ballots taken by schools, and the outcomes of these ballots. It also gives details of major 
changes to the status of grant-maintained schools, such as requests to change admissions policy or 
introduce a sixth form.  This data is matched to the current administrative data, using school names 
and postcodes to identify the equivalent current school where identifiers have changed.  Table 4 
shows the summary characteristics of schools who took a grant-maintained vote, compared to those 
that did not. 
---------------- Table 4 about here ----------------- 
5. Dealing with pupil assignment with unmeasured characteristics 
This analysis attempts to demonstrate the extent to which pupil characteristics not included in CVA 
calculations directly impact on both pupil achievement and the probability of attending an 
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autonomous school, thus confounding CVA-based judgements about the relative performance of 
different school types.   The first part of the analysis extends administrative data for the subset of 
pupils for whom additional background characteristics are available.  The second section 
supplements administrative data with detailed information on pupils from the Longitudinal Survey of 
Young People in England to assess the extent to which there are pupil characteristics not measured 
in the National Pupil Database (NPD) that are correlated with both achievement and type of school 
attended. 
Extending the National Pupil Database 
Foundation schools outperform local authority controlled community schools at GCSE in most 
statistical analysis of NPD.  Table 5 shows the key output from four nested regression equations (all 
clustered to allow for unobserved homogeneity within schools).  Capped GCSE score is regressed on 
four school type variables (with community schools as default) and in the first specification there are 
no other control variables.  The coefficients show that raw GCSE outcomes are about 14 points (or 
0.13 s.d.) higher at foundation schools compared to community schools.  This means the average 
child achieves one grade better in two or three of their best eight subjects at these schools, and this 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In the second specification a basic set of NPD control variables are added.  These include KS2 test 
scores in separate core subjects, which are responsible for a explaining a large proportion of the 
variance in the outcome measure, basic pupil indicators of sex, SEN, FSM, ethnicity and age in 
months.   The foundation school coefficient is still statistically significant at the 1% level, but has 
shrunk to about six points or one grade better in one of eight subjects. 
The third specification mirrors the CVA calculation, where based school peer group measures of the 
FSM and KS2 attainment profile of the school are added.  Additional controls indicating pupil 
mobility (whether the child has moved schools) and small-area deprivation statistics for the child’s 
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home address are included.  The advantage of foundation schools is now just two points, or one-
third of the grade in one subject, but is still significant at the 5% level. 
The magnitude and statistical significance of the foundation school coefficient is little changed by re-
running the regression for the sub-group of pupils for whom there are full administrative data from 
the year 2002 to 2007.  This is clearly a non-random group of pupils since they must have been in 
the English state school system for this entire period, but in this case the selection does not alter 
inference.  At face value, this type of analysis has been used to suggest that sending a child to an 
autonomous school is beneficial, although the positive impact is small.  Extending the NPD to its 
limits does nothing to change this inference. 
---------------- Table 5 about here ----------------- 
Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England 
A set of household characteristics that we believe are important predictors of child outcomes are 
collected in the LSYPE and so we can use this dataset to see whether richer pupil background 
information changes our inferences regarding the impact of school autonomy. Table 6 first replicates 
basic regressions using the NPD variables in the smaller LSYPE sample to ensure there are not major 
sampling problems.  The estimates of the impact of foundation schools are of a similar magnitude in 
this sample and are positive and statistically significant.  The large number of LSYPE control 
variables, including parental education, occupation and income, shrink the estimated coefficient on 
foundation schools to less than 2 points, which is still positive but is now statistically insignificant, so 
in this sample we reject the hypothesis that foundation status has a causal impact on pupil 
achievement.  LSYPE is a rich dataset yet lacks data on characteristics such as the intrinsic motivation 
of the child that might predict attainment, but in this circumstance it has proved sufficient to 
question the validity of CVA-type estimates showing an association between GCSE achievement and 
school autonomy. 
---------------- Table 6 about here ----------------- 
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6. Dealing with policy assignment on unmeasured school characteristics 
The previous section suggests that evidence for the superior performance of foundation schools is 
weaker than first appears because pupil characteristics that explain both school type attended and 
attainment are not included in CVA estimates.  That said, point estimates on the foundation school 
coefficient are consistently positive in the samples used.  However, even if a positive and statistical 
significant impact of foundation schools had been consistently estimated, this would not be 
sufficient to assert causality between the policy of autonomy and achievement because a reverse 
causation could hold whereby particular types of schools or areas chose to pursue autonomous 
status. 
This section investigates the impact of acquiring foundation status on school performance by 
exploiting natural policy variation in the acquisition of autonomy.  As explained earlier, most 
foundation schools acquired their autonomous status through the grant-maintained schools 
legislation of the 1990s and so we can use natural variation in the assignment of this status to 
analyse the impact of being a foundation school today.  The grant-maintained schools policy was 
very controversial, being opposed by LEAs of all shades; many Anglican and RC churches; some 
Department for Education officials; large areas of the press; and teacher unionists (Sherratt, 1994).  
So to legitimise the policy, the government required the Governing Body of schools wishing to 
acquire grant-maintained status to pass a resolution proposing that an election be held; then win a 
majority vote of the parents of current pupils. About two-thirds of the c.850 secondary schools who 
took this vote gained over 50 per cent of the parental vote and thus became grant-maintained 
schools.  Table 7 shows the number of schools for each 2007 governance type that (i) won their 
vote; (ii) lost their vote; and (iii) never took a grant-maintained schools vote. 
---------------- Table 7 about here ----------------- 
The fact that a vote of parents was required to become a grant-maintained school provides an 
important identification strategy for evaluating the policy. There is a clear concern that those 
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schools taking the vote are a non-random selection of all schools in England, thus any improvement 
in test scores might be attributable to systematic unobservable characteristics of this group of 
schools.  However, under assumptions discussed in the next section, the schools that just lost the 
vote to gain grant-maintained status (and so are still community schools today) can be used as the 
policy counterfactual to those who just won the vote. 
A regression discontinuity design (RDD) allows us to identify the effect of becoming a grant-
maintained school using the schools that lost their parental vote as the control group. The 
dichotomous treatment of autonomy (autonomyj) is a deterministic function of the percentage of 
parents voting yes to grant-maintained status in school j (votej), with treatment assigned to vote 
shares greater than 50 per cent.  We cannot use the observed differences in outcomes between our 
groups to infer the impact of treatment on the school’s GCSE performance, i.e. E*gcse1-gcse0], 
because we suspect that a set of (observed or unobserved) covariates such as the affluence or 
political persuasion of the area, xj, alters both the school’s probability of achieving autonomy status 
and GCSE outcomes: 
gcsej = βautonomyj + g(xj) + εj 
votej = f(xj) + υj 
The RDD assumes schools near the threshold of 50 per cent are likely to be similar and thus 
comparable, providing some minimal continuity assumptions for identification are met (see Hahn et 
al., 2001, for details).  It estimates a weighted average treatment effect for the entire population, 
where the weights are the probability that the school draws a vote share near 50 per cent (Lee, 
2005b). This means we can infer little about the potential effects of grant-maintained status for 
those schools who achieved very low or high vote shares, e.g. 10% or 90%, and indeed for those who 
did not take the vote at all.  This observation that the RDD does not identify the average treatment 
effect is important because schools taking the grant-maintained vote do not have the same 
characteristics as other schools, as shown in Table 4.  In this sense it is not a perfect substitute for a 
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randomised experiment across all schools.  Even for the group of schools near the 50% vote share 
there are a set of complicating factors discussed here that determine whether the identification 
strategy is valid (for a more detailed discussions see Allen, 2008).  These complicating factors arise 
because of (i) the circumstances that led to schools taking a vote; (ii) the capacity of the school to 
affect its own vote outcome; (iii) the impact of losing the vote; (iv) the ability of a school to re-ballot 
parents in the event of a lost vote; and (v) a limited number of schools gaining a vote share close to 
the discontinuity. 
(i) The role of the pre-test 
The characteristics and GCSE scores prior to treatment of schools taking the grant-maintained vote 
can be used to partially test the internal validity of the RDD (see Hahn et al., 2001; Lee, 2005a).  Data 
from the Annual Schools Census (presented in Clark, 2009) shows that the mean GCSE scores prior 
to treatment for vote winners versus losers just pass this pre-test of equality at the 5% level on the 
vote share of 15-85%.  Interestingly, the difference between means is consistently negative across all 
possible chosen groups, i.e. vote winners had lower GCSE performance prior to treatment than vote 
losers.  This is somewhat surprising since intuitively we assume that vote winners were more likely 
to be in affluent areas without political opposition to grant-maintained status. However, a significant 
proportion of vote winners were blighted by closure or re-organisation threat (Fitz et al., 1993). One 
implication of this is the functional form of the estimated RDD – whether the dependent variables is 
the change in GCSE scores of the new level of GCSE score – can make a substantive difference to 
short-run estimates. 
(ii) Non-random self selection 
The grant-maintained schools parental vote represents an unusual application of the RDD because 
schools have some influence over their vote, with potential non-random self-selection. Specifically, 
the vote share obtained by the school will be dependent on the headteacher’s persuasiveness and 
campaigning effort (and even parents’ perception of the benefit of the treatment), so that, on 
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average, those who receive the treatment of winning the vote (vote≥50) could be systematically 
more talented or ambitious than those who lost their vote (vote<50).  Lee (2005a) shows that 
provided there is some random chance error component to the vote achieved, the treatment can be 
thought of as statistically randomised around the 50% mark.  McCrary (2008) adds a pre-test that 
should be carried out where agents are able to manipulate the assignment variable, as is the case 
with headteachers and vote share.  The important insight of his test of manipulation is that we 
should not be able to see significant ‘bunching’ of observations that just pass the assignment 
threshold.  This test is passed in the grant-maintained schools database, with no unexpectedly large 
number of schools achieving vote shares between 50 and 55 per cent. 
(iii) Independent causal effect of vote share on school performance 
In identifying the causal effect of grant-maintained status on school GCSE performance, we must 
assume that the random draw of vote share does not itself have an impact on the outcome, except 
through its impact on treatment status (Lee, 2005a). That is, while vote share is allowed to be 
correlated with GCSE outcomes in the population, the vote is not permitted to have an independent 
causal impact on outcomes for a given school.  There is a plausible argument that in our case the 
vote share does have an independent causal impact on schools. A school that wins its grant-
maintained vote may experience a ‘euphoria effect’ that temporarily increases staff motivation, 
resulting in effort directed at improving test scores. Alternatively, a headteacher who wins a 
controversial vote might experience an increase in respect from staff, allowing them to unite 
teachers in pursuing exam-orientated goals. Similarly, the school management who loses their vote 
may well perceive the lack of support for their proposal as a vote of confidence in the school more 
widely. This would be de-motivating, and may even result cause some vote-losing headteachers to 
leave their jobs.  The consequence of this is that we may overstate the short-run impact of 
autonomy, and there is some evidence that vote losers did indeed underperform non-vote taking 
schools in the mid-nineties (Allen, 2008). 
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(iv) Fuzzy discontinuity 
There is a more serious issue in the grant-maintained votes data concerning schools that lost their 
first vote to become grant-maintained, but that went on to hold subsequent votes, which they won. 
We use the first ballot win as our assignment to treatment variable since we think it is this vote 
share that reveals the underlying characteristics of the school, but it is the final ballot that 
determines the long-run treatment status of the school.  Figure 2 shows that 25 of the 233 schools 
losing their grant-maintained vote went on to hold second or third votes of parents, which they 
eventually won, thus becoming grant-maintained schools. 
---------------- Figure 2 about here ----------------- 
There are several possibilities for dealing with this problem in the data. We can use the first vote 
data in a ‘sharp’ RDD, as described earlier, and interpret results as ‘Intention to Treat’ (ITT) estimates 
(Angrist et al., 1996). However, in this case it is not clear the ITT estimates are the ones we want 
since we are interested in the effects of school autonomy and not the effects of taking the grant-
maintained vote. Alternatively we can use the outcome of a first vote (WINj) as an instrument for the 
outcome of the final vote, known as a ‘fuzzy’ RDD: 
 gcsej = β0 + β1autonomyj + k(votej) + εj 
 autonomyj = α0 + α1WINj + h(votej) + υj 
This identifies the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which in this case would be the effect of 
receiving the treatment for schools who won the first vote (and had an expected vote share close to 
the discontinuity).   Both the ITT and IV estimates are reported in the results that follow and 
coefficients are generally quite similar since few schools held a second vote. 
(v) Efficiency versus bias trade-offs 
In an ideal application of an RDD we would want to estimate a conditional expectation function at 
vote=50% since this is not heavily model dependent (Lee, 2005b).  This limits approach is contingent 
on having a great deal of observations very close to the discontinuity, yet just 60 schools had first 
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vote outcomes between 45 and 55 per cent.  This is likely to be an insufficient number of schools to 
identify an impact, given predicted effect sizes, so risks of Type II statistical errors are high. 
The standard parametric approach to dealing with this is to estimate the effect of winning the grant-
maintained vote versus losing over a wider band of vote share values (e.g. votes between 15 and 
85%) and use linear approximations to generate simple estimates of the discontinuity gap.  For 
example, the dependent variable could be regressed on the vote share, separately on each side of 
the threshold. This parametric form, which is common in the RDD literature, exploits more data than 
the use of a narrow band, and can therefore be more efficient. It is also possible that it generates 
less biased estimates of the true conditional expectation function at the vote=50 threshold than a 
simple difference in means on a narrower band, where the true function has a non-zero slope.  
However, the critical assumption is that the parametric regression function used for extrapolation is 
correctly specified (Lee, 2005b). In our case, we have no a priori evidence that vote share should be 
a linear function of exam score growth. Indeed, this particular regression discontinuity is particularly 
unusual because it is not entirely clear how vote share should enter the education production 
function at all: we are quite vague about the unobserved characteristics it proxies. 
There are three quite separate sets of characteristics that are unmeasured in the education function 
and that the vote share may therefore proxy. First, vote share reflects the effort put in by the 
headteacher and Governing Body to win the vote and it is possible, for example, that heads highly 
motivated to become grant-maintained are also highly motivated by league table position. Second, 
vote share reflects the political attitudes of the parental body, and this is correlated with socio-
economic background and therefore the academic performance of their children. It could also 
reflect the degree of confidence that parents have in the school’s headteacher more generally, or 
even their perceived belief in the capacity of the school to benefit from the treatment. Third, vote 
share reflects the external circumstances the school faced at the time, in particular whether or not it 
expected to be closed or re-organised in the near future.  
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That said, there is less concern about bias when estimating a RDD with a large set of covariates to 
account for differences around the threshold, thus reducing bias on estimates of school 
effectiveness (and without dimensionality problems since the number of pupils is very large) 
(Frölich, 2007). These control variables also account for a large proportion of the variance in the 
outcome GCSE variable, thus increasing the precision of estimates and enabling statistical 
significance to be potentially achieved for the relatively narrow band of vote winners and losers. 
Short-run effects of the grant-maintained schools policy 
Clark (2009) applies the RDD to estimate the effect of winning the grant-maintained vote on school 
GCSE performance for between one and eight years after the change in school status. School GCSE 
performance is measured as the percentage of pupils gaining 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C at age 
16 (the only available metric in datasets available for the relevant time period). Clark finds a 
moderate positive effect of grant-maintained status in the order of a one quarter of a standard 
deviation (or 4-6 percentage points) change in school performance after two years. 
Clark finds this positive effect of grant-maintained status to be persistent over the eight years 
following the change in school status, but is not able to control for changes in sorting (either through 
school exclusions or more importantly through school admissions) due to a lack of pupil-level 
administrative data for this period.  This may be important because there was a very sharp increase 
(as much as three-fold) in the number of permanent exclusion made by schools in the early 1990s, 
which Gillborn (1996) attributes to increased school competition and the publication of league 
tables.  Clark’s positive finding of the impact of grant-maintained status contradicts Levačid and 
Hardman (1999) who do not employ an RDD, but instead carry out a difference-in-difference analysis 
of the change in the performance of grant-maintained schools compared to LEA schools from 1991 
to 1996. They agree with Clark that on a straightforward comparison of GCSE examination 
performance, the rate of improvement was higher for grant-maintained schools. However, when 
they added school control variables they found that this apparently superior performance could be 
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attributed to having falling proportions of socially disadvantaged students in grant-maintained 
schools. 
Long-run effects of the grant-maintained schools policy 
There are difficulties with using data over 15 years after a policy is introduced to identify long-term 
effects, even where the original policy intervention had a randomised element. First, sorting of 
pupils across schools, neighbourhoods and even cities will have occurred in this time period. Indeed, 
theory predicts this is a likely outcome of the intervention. This makes it more difficult to distinguish 
between school effectiveness and unobserved pupil characteristics. However, since 2002 the 
National Pupil Database has given us information on where pupils live, enabling us to describe the 
nature of the sorting effects that control over admissions has on the allocation of pupils across 
schools.  Allen (2007) explores the relationship between residential sorting, school sorting and the 
presence of foundation schools in area, finding that foundation schools are associated with high 
levels of post-residential sorting.  Figure 3 plots the proportion of pupils eligible for free school 
meals in the cohort of 2007 school-leavers, grouped by the proportion of parents voting yes to 
grant-maintained status in the 1990s.  It confirms that vote winning schools do now have marginally 
lower FSM proportions than the vote losing schools that remained as local authority controlled 
schools, so this should be accounted for when comparing the GCSE achievement of these schools in 
2007. 
---------------- Figure 3 about here ----------------- 
Figure 4 plots the average 2007 capped GCSE point score for schools (grouped to nearest 5%) who 
took a grant-maintained vote in the 1990s.  It shows that there does not appear to be a clear 
discontinuity in 2007 exam performance between non-grammar schools that did, and did not, win 
the vote.  However, the vote winning schools close to the 50% discontinuity do have a slightly higher 
capped GCSE score than the vote losing schools. 
---------------- Figure 4 about here ----------------- 
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The visual examination of the recent GCSE data for vote taking schools does not control for sorting 
of pupils that has taken place since the policy was in place.  Table 8 shows the RDD results for a 
series of regressions of 2007 capped GCSE point scores on whether the grant-maintained vote was 
won or not. It does this first for schools whose parental yes vote was between 35% and 65%, then 
for schools whose vote share was between 15% and 85%: the first set of results are less likely to 
have biased point estimates, but they have fewer observations so less precision. On each occasion 
both the simple ITT coefficient (whether the school won the first vote) and the two-stage IV 
coefficient (instrumenting grant-maintained status on the first vote share result) are reported.  
The first column of estimates shows that the raw differences in GCSE point scores between vote 
winners and losers is around 5 points (or one grade difference in one of eight subjects); this is not 
statistically significant. When full pupil characteristics and peer group variables are added, the gap 
between winners and losers is actually slightly negative and is again not statistically significant. This 
suggests that there is no evidence that a policy of school autonomy produces more effective 
secondary schools. It is perfectly possible that foundation schools are effective schools, but if they 
are then so are schools that remained in LEA control because they lost the grant-maintained vote. If 
so, this tells us more about the type of schools that elected to hold a parental vote than the causal 
effect of a policy, per se. More likely given the analysis in the first part of this paper, there is no 
genuine difference in the effectiveness of LEA controlled and autonomous schools, with apparent 
effectiveness of foundation schools attributable to unmeasured characteristics of pupils in these 
schools today. 
---------------- Table 8 about here ----------------- 
7. Conclusion 
Education policy reforms are usually made without a randomised element so that quantitative 
researchers struggle to find a good counterfactual for the policy not having taken place.  This 
undermines our ability to draw headline conclusions about whether the policy works.  Analysis of 
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the long-run impact of changes in school governance face two sorting problems: the policy is not 
usually randomly assigned to areas and pupils start to re-sort across schools in response to the 
policy.  So there is a risk that inference is confounded because schools of a particular level of 
effectiveness acquire a change in governance, or because particular types of families are attracted to 
autonomous schools. 
This paper has investigated these methodological problems by examining the likely causal impact of 
foundation school status is on pupil achievement at GCSE.  This long-standing policy of autonomy is 
not particularly radical but gives schools important control over capital, staffing and other 
operational decisions.  It was chosen to analyse because it might inform stable state impacts of 
autonomy and because the manner of its inception created a control group of schools that failed to 
acquire the status. 
The analysis demonstrates the magnitude of the problem of non-random assignment of pupils to 
schools using extended pupil background variables from NPD and LSYPE to control for factors that 
determine both school assignment and pupil achievement.  It shows there is little evidence that 
foundation schools outperform community schools once pupil background characteristics are fully 
accounted for.  The problem of non-random assignment of policy to areas is tackled using the grant-
maintained schools vote of parents which created a discontinuity whereby apparently similar 
schools just did, or did not, receive the treatment.  It shows foundation schools that gained their 
autonomous status as a result of ‘just’ winning the parental vote perform no better in GCSE 
examinations than community schools who ‘just’ lost their parental vote.  We should conclude from 
this that the introduction of grant-maintained status may have led to quite substantial 
improvements in pupil achievement in the short-term, but these have no persisted to today. 
The main purpose of this study has been to showcase methods for overcoming non-random 
assignment in natural policy settings and we should be cautious in interpreting the substantive 
findings to autonomy policies more widely.  For example, it is perfectly possible that the Academies 
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programme is successful in raising standards through independence from local authority control 
since it is far more radical, though early impact evaluations suggest this has not been the case so far 
(Machin and Wilson, 2008).  Similarly, faith schools may well have real characteristics that benefit 
their pupils beyond secular autonomous schools and there are papers that discuss the extent this is 
likely to be true using techniques to overcome unobserved pupil characteristics (Allen and Vignoles, 
2009; Gibbons and Silva, 2006).  Most of the studies mentioned above, taken with this one, suggest 
that any new policies that give schools autonomy without other major institutional changes are 
unlikely to lead to sustained improvements in pupil exam performance. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Key descriptive variables 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Capped best 8 GCSE scores 577,332 293.27 104.78 0.00 540.00 
Five A*-C, including English and maths 577,332 43.89%    
KS2 science score 550,313 4.69 0.69 0.00 6.00 
KS2 maths score 550,063 4.38 0.91 0.00 6.00 
KS2 English reading score 531,249 4.55 0.82 0.00 5.95 
KS2 English writing score 530,878 4.10 0.75 0.00 5.94 
Female 577,332 49.44%    
English as an additional language 576,195 10.10%    
White British ethnicity 576,332 81.38%    
Special Education Needs (statemented or 
school action plus) 560,562 7.88%    
Special Education Needs (school action) 560,562 11.22%    
Free school meals eligibility 560,562 12.85%    
IDACI for home postcode 569,986 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.99 
Note: 164 grammar schools are dropped here and for all analysis that follows 
 
Table 2: Governance of secondary schools in dataset 
 Percentage of pupils (%) 
Community 62.99 
Voluntary Controlled 3.09 
Voluntary Aided 14.26 
Foundation 18.23 
CTC/Academy 1.44 
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Table 3: Summary of additional LSYPE variables 
 N Type 
Employment and wealth variables:   
Employment status and type of main parent 14,523 9 categories 
Household income (with some imputation for missingness using related 
variables) 
10,810, imputed 
to 14,569 
Continuous 
Family receives state benefits such as job seekers allowance or income 
support 
14,308 Binary 
Family receives tax credits such as child tax credit 14,308 Binary 
Household owns their home 14,386 Binary 
Household rents from the council or housing association 14,386 Binary 
Household has no (i) computer access; (ii) internet access 14,302; 14,282 Binary 
Number of cars in household 14,448 4 categories 
Parental education variables:   
Age the main parent left school 14,223 5 categories 
Main parent returned to school after leaving 14,294 Binary 
Household structure variables:   
Marital status of main parent 14,382 7 categories 
Household family structure 14,440 5 categories 
Number of children in household 14,409 5 categories 
Number of children aged (i) 0-2 years; (ii) 3-11 years; (iii) 12-15 years; 
(iv) 16-17 years 
14,373 2, 4, 3 and 3 
categories 
Additional child circumstances variables:   
Child was born in the UK 14,351 Binary 
Child arrived in the UK in 2000 or more recently 14,351 Binary 
Number of schools the child has attended up to age of 13 14,127 4 categories 
Number of school moves made at non-standard times 14,127 4 categories 
Note: the data is clustered and sample probability weighted 
 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of vote-taking schools 
 Won vote first time Lost first vote Never took vote 
Total KS2 test score 13.62 (2.14) 13.54 (2.20) 13.34 (2.31) 
FSM eligibility 8.96%  11.91%  13.90%  
SEN (statement or plus) 6.92%  7.28%  8.18%  
SEN (action) 10.24%  10.62%  11.52%  
White British ethnicity 79.86%  81.68%  81.72%  
English not first language 9.31%  10.17%  10.29%  
Number of pupils 103,043  47,906  426,383  
Number of schools 521  223  2239  
Won subsequent re-ballot   10.37%    
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Table 5: School type estimates from NPD regressions 
 No controls NPD controls CVA Everything 
Foundation 14.12 (1.71) ** 6.06 (0.99) ** 1.93 (0.93) * 2.25 (1.02) * 
Voluntary aided 26.14 (1.94) ** 9.29 (1.04) ** 6.57 (1.00) ** 6.64 (1.10) ** 
CTC/Academies -6.52 (8.60) n.s. 4.22 (4.45) n.s. 28.48 (3.91) ** 28.77 (4.26) ** 
Voluntary controlled 16.93 (3.16) ** 6.37 (1.91) ** 7.41 (2.27) ** 6.37 (2.30) ** 
4 KS2 scores (maths, science, 
English, total squared) No Yes Yes Yes 
Sex, EAL, SEN, FSM, ethnicity (11), 
age No Yes Yes Yes 
School peer (FSM, KS2, s.d. of KS2) No No Yes Yes 
Extra background (IDACI and 
mobility) No No Yes Yes 
Extended NPD (KS2 sub-scores; 4 
KS1 scores; multiple SEN, FSM and 
IDACI) No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.88% 51.30% 53.56% 46.06% 
Number of pupils 582,347 547,716 545,568 358,393 
Number of schools 2964 2936 2936 2933 
Notes:  (a) regression estimates clustered for unobserved school homogeneity 
            (b) **=significant at 1%; *=significant at 5% level 
 
 
 
Table 6: School type estimates from LSYPE regressions 
 No controls NPD controls LSYPE controls 
Foundation 20.47 (5.56) ** 8.65 (3.48) * 1.88 (2.67) n.s. 
Voluntary aided 33.78 (4.75) ** 12.13 (3.09) *** 9.59 (2.69) ** 
CTC/Academies 82.33 (5.19) ** 30.53 (14.48) * 31.84 (11.22) ** 
Voluntary controlled 35.36 (3.15) ** 13.86 (9.33) n.s. 4.45 (8.87) n.s. 
4 KS2 scores (maths, science, reading, writing) No Yes Yes 
Sex, EAL, SEN, FSM, ethnicity (11), age No Yes Yes 
School peer (FSM, FSMsq, KS2, KS2sq) No No Yes 
Household income and benefits, parental 
education and employment, family structure, 
computer/internet/car at home, country of 
origin, mobility information, home ownership. No No Yes 
R-squared 1.81% 50.14% 56.11% 
Number of pupils 14,097 13,149 12,260 
Notes:  (a) weights applied to account for sampling structure 
(b) **=significant at 1%; *=significant at 5% level 
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Table 7: Governance in 2007 of grant-maintained vote winners and losers 
 
Final grant-
maintained ballot 
won 
Final grant-
maintained ballot 
lost 
Grant-maintained 
ballot never taken 
Grammar (all governance types) 94 8 70 
CTC/Academy 0 0 50 
Community (non-grammar) 10 151 1,678 
Foundation (non-grammar) 404 13 90 
Voluntary-aided (non-grammar) 130 26 334 
Voluntary-controlled (non-grammar) 0 10 67 
 638 208 2289 
 
 
 
Table 8: RDD of vote winners and losers 
  No controls NPD controls CVA Everything 
V = [35,65] Vote winners (ITT) 4.92 (4.73) -0.12 (2.54) -1.14 (2.30) -1.95 (2.56) 
 Vote winners (IV) 5.83 (5.59) -0.14 (3.01) -1.36 (2.72) -2.33 (3.05) 
 R-squared 0.08% 50.04% 51.08% 45.63% 
 Number of pupils 46301 42663 42663 27784 
  Number of schools 219 218 218 218 
V = [15,85] Vote winners (ITT) 4.65 (3.17) 1.64 (1.84) 0.46 (1.69) 0.14 (1.91) 
 Vote winners (IV) 5.23 (3.55) 1.85 (2.07) 0.51 (1.90) 0.16 (2.14) 
 R-squared 0.08% 48.49% 49.46% 44.92% 
 Number of pupils 118684 108783 108783 71857 
  Number of schools 567 566 566 566 
Controls KS2 marks in core subjects No Yes Yes Yes 
 Standard NPD controls No Yes Yes Yes 
 School peer controls No No Yes Yes 
  Extended NPD, incl. KS1 No No No Yes 
Note: regression estimates clustered for unobserved school homogeneity 
See earlier NPD regressions for full details of control variables included 
 
32 
 
 
Figure 1: An education production function 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Re-balloting creates a fuzzy discontinuity 
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Figure 3: 2007 FSM proportions at vote taking schools  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average capped GCSE score at vote-taking schools in 2007 
 
Note: Charts for alternative outcome measures (e.g. 5+ A*-C) look identical 
 
